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PUBLIC RIGHTS AND COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUMt
Until recently, the coastal zone of the nation was considered a
limitless resource to be freely used by man for recreation and profit.
Settlement and industrialization resulted in uncoordinated use of the
coastal areas and in degradation, filling, diking and draining of many
of the coastal wetlands. The pressures of conflicting use patterns have
finally resulted, however, in the realization that governmental manage-
ment is necessary to preserve the essential characteristics of these fragile
and beautiful areas. Ecologists have also called attention to the irre-
placeable value of the principal ecosystem of the coastal zone, the es-
tuary, with its associated beaches and marshlands.
An estuary has been defined as a "semi-enclosed coastal body of
water which has a free connection with the open sea."' There is usually
some tidal action within an estuary, causing sea water to be mixed with
fresh water from land drainage.2 Estuaries exist at the mouths of rivers,
behind barrier islands, and along coastal bays where the land meets the
sea and there is a fresh water inflow.3 The maintenance of the estuary
as an ecosystem depends on protecting three essential parameters: the
shape of the estuary, the water properties of the estuary and the circula-
tion of water in the estuary.4 The shape of the estuary refers to its size,
its form, and the character and topography of its bottom.- The water
properties include the chemical content, salinity, temperature, and
transparency of the water.6 The circulation pattern within the estuary
tAssociate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. This work is a result of research
sponsored by NOAA Office of Sea Grant, Department of Commerce under Grant No. GH-103.
The United States Government is authorized to produce and distribute reprints for governmental
purposes notwithstanding any copyright notice that may appear hereon. Research assistance was
provided by Luther T. Moore, J.D. 1972, University of North Carolina School of Law, and
Marianne K. Smythe, a second year law student at the University of North Carolina. Their help
is gratefully acknowledged.
1E. ODUM, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOLOGY 352 (3d ed. 1971). For a readable guide to estuarine
ecology see J. TEAL & M. TEAL, LIFE AND DEATH OF THE SALT MARSH (1969). See also ESTUARIES
(G. Lauffed. 1967).
2E. ODUM, supra note 1, at 352.
3Butman, Land Use-Estuarine Interactions: Some Considerations, in PAPERS ON NATIONAL
LAND USE POLICY ISSUES PREPARED FOR THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR
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is determined by the direction and speed of currents and how fast estuar-
ine water is replenished by new river water and replaced by seawater.7
Professor Pritchard has classified estuaries into four types: the
drowned river valley such as Chesapeake Bay on the Atlantic coast of
the United States; the fjord-type estuary, which consists of deep coastal
indentures gouged out by glaciers, such as occur in Norway, British
Columbia and Alaska; the bar-built estuary, characterized by shallow
basins enclosed by a chain of barrier islands and broken at intervals by
inlets, such as is typical along the coast of North Carolina; and estuaries
produced by tectonic processes, characterized by coastal indentures pro-
duced by geological faulting or local subsidence, such as San Francisco
Bay.8 Professor Odum would add a fifth type of estuary, the river delta,
such as the mouth of the Mississippi or the Nile.'
The physical characteristics of an estuary make it an ideal place
for the formation of the salt marsh, which is an integral part of the
estuarine system. The salt marsh is typically formed at the border of
the estuary where sediment that has been eroded from the continent
settles out from the water, causing the bay bottom to rise to the level
of low tide. The marsh grows vertically upward and laterally outward
to cover virtually the entire area of sediment deposit."0 A drainage sys-
tem develops in the form of small creeks that follow the previous chan-
nels of the bay, and the entire area is regularly innundated by the tides.
The major plants characteristic of the salt marsh in North America are
cord grass (Spartina alterniflora) and marsh hay (Spartina patens),
although mud algae and phytoplankton are also important."
Although experts formerly considered estuaries a "wasteland, '"'
they now recognize that because of the kinds and variety of producer
organisms in the salt marsh and because of the tidal action that removes
waste and transports food and nutrients, the estuary is one of the most
highly productive areas on earth. Because of the unique abundance of
71d. at 165.
8Pritchard, What Is An Estuary: Physical Viewpoint, in ESTUARIES (G. Lauff ed. 1967).
'E. ODUNI, supra note 1, at 352-54.
"Tripp, The Ecological Importance of a Salt Marsh, in PAPERS 169.
"Id.
12Examples of this attitude can be found in case law. Typical is Oldfield v. Stoico Homes, Inc.,
26 N.J. 246, 139 A.2d 291 (1958) where the court, in construing a condition contained in a deed
to wetland property, chose a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent rather than a fee simple
determinable so as to encourage draining of the marsh. Tlhe court found a public policy in favor
of draining and filling salt marshes.
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nutrients and the sheltered condition of the estuary, many species of fish
inhabit it during their entire life cycle. Ocean species of finfish and
shellfish use the estuaries either as a nursery ground or as a zone of
passage to fresh water rivers. 3 Approximately ninety percent of the
total harvest taken by commercial fishermen in the United States is
dependent on the estuaries." The salt marshes are essential to coastal
fisheries since at least sixty species of fish are dependent on the estuarine
ecosystem at some stage in their life cycle. 15 These include shrimp,
flounder, menhaden, bluefish, anchovies, and striped bass. 6 In addition,
many species of birds and mammals could not exist without the estu-
aries. This area is inhabited by ducks, herons, egrets, rails, ospreys,
raccoons, muskrats, and deer. 7 The estuarine environment is also essen-
tial as a resilient buffer zone that protects the land against erosion from
storm waves and saves the expense of erecting artificial barriers to
protect coastal structures and cropland."5 The marshes are essential for
the maintenance of coastal navigation. In their natural state, marshes
trap and hold sediment that would otherwise be deposited in harbors
and navigation channels. 9
Legal and institutional innovations are needed to protect estuarine
and coastal resources. The purpose of this article is to examine the
principal legal aspects of coastal zone resource management. After re-
viewing present law relating to public rights in the lands and waters of
the coastal zone and existing patterns of legislation for coastal resource
preservation, suggestions will be advanced for the creation of a coastal
zone management agency and development of a plan for managing
coastal resources. In order to provide meaningful analysis without un-
duly prolonging the length of this article, discussion will center on the
law of one particular jurisdiction, the State of North Carolina." The
11E. ODUNI, supra note I, at 356.
"Tripp, supra note 10, at 172. See also 3 FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, NATIONAL ESTUARY STUDY, H. R. Doc. No. 286 Part II, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 115-
116 (1970).





"The Pamlico-Albemarle-Currituck Sound estuarine area of North Carolina is the second
largest estuarine complex on the east coast of the United States. It consists of four major river
systems which flow into a huge shallow basin separated from the ocean by North Carolina's Outer
Banks, a series of barrier islands broken by inlets through which salt water can mix with the fresh
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principles developed, however, may be applied by analogy to other
coastal states.
I. PUBLIC RIGHTS IN THE COASTAL ZONE
In the contemporary concern over the development of coastal zone
management programs, it is easy to overlook the fact that a body of law
already exists that provides substantial public rights in the land and
water resources of the estuaries and the coastal zone. Many of the
relevant legal doctrines date from medieval English and even Roman
times.2 ' These rights should properly form the point of departure for any
coastal zone management program. Public rights can be derived either
through state ownership of submerged lands or by reason of several
state law doctrines that are not dependent upon ownership.
A. Public Rights Derived from State Ownership
1. Federal Law. In order to understand the extent of existing
public rights in the lands and waters of the coastal zone, it is first
necessary to discuss the problem of legal title to the beds of the rivers,
sounds, and seas of this area, because to the extent such lands are owned
by the state, their resources can be managed for the benefit of the public.
Some of the law bearing on this issue can be regarded as relatively
settled. As between the states and the federal government, it has long
been established that the states own tidelands and the beds of bays,
navigable rivers, and lakes.22 By the Submerged Lands Act,23 Congress
in 1953 confirmed the states' title to the beds of the marginal seas along
a belt that extends three miles24 seaward from the ordinary low water
water that drains from the land. The salinity levels of the sounds vary greatly, ranging from almost
fresh water in Currituck Sound to virtual seawater in Core Sound. Tidal action is about three feet
near the inlets but is barely noticeable in the further reaches of the sounds. Habitat within the
ecosystem includes hardwood swamps in low areas within the flood plain of fresh water streams,
extensive salt marsh complexes, mud flats, vegetated shallows and the open waters of the sounds.
The area thus supports a wide variety of high value fish and wildlife resources and has been only
slightly modified by man. 3 FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 14, at 113-18.
21See Comment, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A. Sometime Submerged Traditional Doc-
trine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970).
22Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1 (1894); Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212
(1845); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
-43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1970).
"4As to the Gulf coast of Florida and Texas the grant extended three marine leagues, approxi-
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mark.25 More important for the purpose of determining the extent of
public rights, however, is the question of the ownership of submerged
lands as between the state and private parties. For this purpose, it is
necessary to understand the origin of the doctrine of state ownership of
submerged land.
Analysis of the law of ownership of these lands must begin with
English common law. About the time of the Magna Carta, it became
established as common law that title to lands over which the tides ebbed
and flowed was in the King. Such lands were held by the King in jus
publicum, in trust for the common use and benefit of the public.26 This
concept of sovereign ownership of the tidelands and the related public
trust doctrine became a part of American law at the formation of the
Union.
However, the Supreme Court of the United States has modified
and extended the doctrine. The Court first established that upon the
formation of the United States, the original thirteen states succeeded to
the ownership rights in submerged lands formerly held by the British
Crown. 27 The test adopted by the Supreme Court to determine the
extent of such ownership rights was the concept of "navigability."" The
definition of "navigable" has caused some difficulty. Navigability for
title purposes was originally believed to depend upon whether the waters
were affected by the ebb and flow of the tides. Martin v. Waddell," the
first case dealing with state ownership of the beds of navigable waters
considered by the Supreme Court, involved tidelands, and title to lands
under Raritan Bay, New Jersey, was held to have passed to the state
mately ten and one-half miles. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 36-65 (1960); United States
v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960).
z'Significant boundary questions between the states and the federal government still remain,
however, particularly as to the seaward boundary of the states. Litigation is pending in the United
States Supreme Court between the federal government and all the Atlantic coast states to establish
offshore boundaries. See Krueger, The Background of the Doctrine of the Continental Shelf and
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 10 NAT. RES. J. 442, 454-55 (1970).
21The history and development of the English doctrine is recounted in Comment, 79 YALE L.J.,
supra note 21, at 764-74. In addition, see 2 A. SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 518-19
(1964). See also Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
"Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842). When the colonies formed the Ameri-
can Union, they did not surrender any property rights in submerged lands, but did grant to the
United States the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
"Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).
2141 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
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upon the formation of the American Union.30 Moreover, the Supreme
Court in 1825 had held that federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
did not extend to the Missouri River because it was above the ebb and
flow of the tide.31 In 1851, however, the Court rejected the ebb-and-
flow test for purposes of determining admiralty jurisdiction and held all
navigable-in-fact waters constituting a link in interstate or foreign com-
merce to be within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States, whether or not those waters were affected by tides."2
The next landmark Supreme Court case involving the concept of
navigability was decided in 1870. In The Daniel Ball,3" which involved
the power of the federal government to regulate commerce on a rela-
tively small inland river, the Court clearly adopted the "navigable-in-
fact" test and gave it a new function. It stated that for commerce clause
purposes inland waters must be regarded as navigable-in-fact "when
they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condi-
tion, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may
be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water." 34
In 1876, the Court finally clarified the relationship between the test
of navigability for the purposes of federal admiralty jurisdiction and the
extent of federal power to regulate interstate commerce and the test of
navigability to determine title of submerged lands. Barney v. City of
Keokuk" involved the ownership of lands under the Mississippi River
in Iowa. Although no tidelands were involved, the Court held the river
to be navigable for title determination purposes, and ownership was
found to be in the State of Iowa.36 The Court used the same test of
navigability that it had used in The Daniel Ball and made it clear that
this test is the American rule .3 The new navigable-in-fact test was,
however, an extension rather than a complete rejection of the ebb-and-
flow test, since the latter still applied to title determination questions
"'Id. at 416.
"The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825). Shalowitz contends that
the Supreme Court incorrectly inferred from English law that ebb and flow was the test of naviga-
bility. He believes that in England the concept of navigable waters included rivers and lakes not
affected by the action of the tides. See 2 A. SHALOWITZ, supra note 26, at 519.
3rhe Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454 (1851).
177 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
"Id. at 563.





involving the tidelands. 8 When either of these two tests are met, state
title extends beyond the channels actually used for navigation to the
lands beneath the shallows at the limits of the waters;3' in the case of
tidelands, title extends to the line of mean high tide,40 while in the case
of inland navigable waters under the navigable-in-fact test, title extends
to the mean high water mark. 1
Thus it can be maintained that at the time North Carolina became
part of the American Union as one of the thirteen original states it
acquired title (1) to tidelands below the ordinary high water mark,
including marshlands and shallows, and (2) to land to the mean high
water mark beneath inland waters that were navigable-in-fact at that
time.12 These lands were held in trust for the people of the state.
2. State Law. Although federal law determines the extent of the
submerged lands each state acquired upon its admission to the Union,
the subsequent disposition of such lands is a matter of state law. 3 Thus
in order to determine the present extent of any state's ownership of
submerged lands it is necessary to explore the law of the particular state
from the time it became a state to the present. Since the law of each
state has developed separately, an analysis must be made on a state-by-
state basis. This article will consider primarily the law of North Caro-
lina.
In general, there are two ways in which title to state-owned public
trust lands could have passed into private ownership pursuant to state
"Id. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 43 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 435-36 (1892).
"United States v. Turner, 175 F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 851 (1949).
"Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26-27 (1935). There are some
exceptions to this general rule. Pre-statehood grants by the Crown in the case of the colonies or
by the United States in the case of the territories are valid. In some New England states, private
owners took title under colonial ordinances to coastal lands to the low-tide mark or one hundred
rods of tideland, whichever was less. See discussion in I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 37.2(C),
at 207 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
"Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336 (1876).
"New states entering the Union subsequent to the adoption of the Constitution were admitted
on an "equal footing" with the original states and thus acquired the same ownership rights in the
tidelands and in the lands under inland navigable waters. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212
(1845). The legal test for determining state ownership of submerged lands at the time of admission
to the Union is a matter of federal not state law. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14, 27 (1935);
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55
(1926).
"Shively b. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876); Pollard
v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
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law: (1) an express conveyance or grant made by the state to a private
owner pursuant to state law or (2) legal error, when the state has re-
garded waters as non-navigable and has held the bed to be private
property even though the waters were navigable under the federal test
for title and bed title was actually acquired by the state upon its admis-
sion to the Union." In the latter case, title would pass into private
ownership through erroneous state judicial doctrine. 5
(a) State Transfer of Public Trust Land. Unlike some states,"
North Carolina has never made any general transfer of its public trust
lands to private individuals. Throughout the history of the state, how-
ever, particular tracts of such lands have been sold or granted to private
owners in accordance with state law. The extent of such grants is un-
clear, however, because of the ambiguity of the statutes under which the
grants have been made.
Until 1959 the principal means for acquiring state lands was
through compliance with the entry-and-grant laws." The initial entry
statute of 1777 provided that in surveys of land on navigable waters the
waters were to form one side of the survey." However, navigability was
not defined. In Tatum v. Sawyer, 9 the North Carolina Supreme. Court
interpreted this statute to mean that lands under navigable waters were
not subject to entry, and in Wilson v. Forbes,50 the court stated that the
term "navigable waters" as found in the entry-and-grant statute in-
cluded inland non-tidal waters as well as waters affecetd by the ebb and
flow of the tide. The court declined, however, to define the term "navig-
ability. ' '51 In 1825-26, the Literary Board of North Carolina was given
"C. MEYERS & A. TARLOCK, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 793 (1971). Title could also
pass into private ownership through fraud. Id.
451d.
4 The General Assembly of Georgia has enacted legislation purporting to grant to owners of
the abutting land all the non-navigable tidewaters in the state and, in the case of navigable tidewa-
ters, to extend the title of the abutting owner to the low water mark. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1309
(1970). The effect of this grant is in dispute. See Note, Regulation and Ownership of the Marsh-
lands: The Georgia Marshlands Act, 5 GA. L. REV. 563, 574-75 (1971).
47A comprehensive review of the history of these laws can be found in Rice, Estuarine Land
of North Carolina: Legal Aspects of Ownership, Use and Control, 46 N.C.L. REV. 779 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Rice].
4sCh. I, § 9 [17771 N.C. Sess. L., 24 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 45-46 (W.
Clark'ed. 1905).
499 N.C. 226 (1822).




control over all vacant and unappropriated "swamp lands, '5 2 but entry
of such lands was prohibited except in the case of lands under fifty acres
located between the lines of previously granted lands. 3 The term
"swamp lands" was not defined, however, although some public trust
lands were undoubtedly involved. In 1830-3 1, the North Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly opened to entry marshlands in which the quantity of land
in any one marsh did not exceed two thousand acres and the lands
involved had not previously been surveyed by the state.54 Thus, although
the prohibition against entry of land under inland and tidal navigable
waters was still operative, it was possible after the passage of these two
amendments to enter and obtain title to either of the two categories of
marshland.
In 1837 the North Carolina entry-and-grant law was reorganized,
especially as it pertained to swamplands. In order to implement a legis-
lative policy of draining and reclaiming vacant and unappropriated
swamplands to provide funds for the common schools, the Literary
Board was given wide powers. The Board's control over the disposition
of such lands was reaffirmed. 5 It was also provided that all deeds
granted prior to 1837 had to be registered in the county where the land
was located; any deed not registered within twelve months was null and
void, and title reverted to the state. 6 Swamplands of not more than fifty
acres situated between previously entered land and swamplands not
exceeding two thousand acres which had not yet been surveyed by the
state were still open for entry and grant. In addition, the Literary Board
was given the power to survey and reclaim swamplands and sell them
at public auction.5 1 Moreover, the 1837 law omitted the methods pro-
vided in the 1777 act for surveying lands bordering on navigable waters.
This oversight was corrected in 1846-47, 58but it has been held that from
1837 until 1847, only lands beneath tidal waters were exempt from
entry.59 In 1881, the Literary Board was replaced by the Board of Edu-
cation, which succeeded to all the powers formerly exercised by the
52Ch. I, [1826] N.C. Sess. L. 3.
-Ch. 6, [1826] N.C. Sess. L. 5; Ch. 6, [1827] N.C. Sess. L. 13.
"Ch. 12, [1830] N.C. Sess. L. 15.
-Ch. 23, § 3, [1836-37] N.C. Sess. L. 131.
"'Ch. 23, § 10, [1836-37] N.C. Sess. L. 134.
TCh. 23, § 5, [1836-37] N.C. Sess. L. 132.
-Ch. 36, § 1, [1846-47] N.C. Sess. L. 97.
"Hatfield v. Grimsted, 29 N.C. 138 (1846); Resort Dev. Co. v. Parmele, 235 N.C. 689, 71
S.E.2d 474 (1952).
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Board.6" The dual system of sale and entry and grant remained in effect
until 1959, when the North Carolina General Assembly abolished the
entry and grant system in favor of a procedure of direct sale and lease
of state lands. The 1959 State Lands Act" provides that lands under
waters navigable-in-fact or beneath the Atlantic Ocean within three
miles of the coast may not be conveyed; only easements may be acquired
by private parties.62 "Swamp lands," however, may still be sold in .fee.63
It is evident, therefore, that some public trust lands have been sold
or granted by the state and can be validly claimed by private parties. 4
The present extent of private claims to public trust land is unclear.
North Carolina attempted to solve the problem in 1965 by requiring
registration on or before January 1, 1970, of all claims of title to any
part of the bed lying under navigable waters and any right of fishery in
navigable waters superior to that of the general public. 5 At this writing
the claims filed have been sorted and plotted on maps, but their validity
has not been determined.66 It would seem that this registration statute
offers at best only a partial solution to the problem. It is doubtful
whether failure to register a claim could constitutionally divest an other-
wise valid title.6" Moreover, the statute employs the ambiguous term
"navigable waters" as the criterion for claims that had to be registered.
It is thus probable that the validity of private claims to public trust
lands, whether tidal marshes or lands under navigable waters, can only
G°Ch. 200, [1881] N.C. Sess. L. 371.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-1 (1964).
"I1d. §§ 146-3, -12 (1964).
-Id. §§ 146-3, -4 (1964).
"There are also other bases under which ownership claims may bdmade. Title may be asserted
under a grant from the Crown or a Lord Proprietor during the colonial or pre-colonial period,
but the validity of such a claim is questionable. See Comment, Defining Navigable Waters and
the Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine in North Carolina, 49 N.C.L. REV. 888, 907-08 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Defining Navigable Waters]. Claims based on adverse possession are also
doubtful. See State v. Brooks, 275 N.C. 175, 166 S.E.2d 70 (1969). Express legislative grants have
been recognized as valid, however. See Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina
Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 177 S.E.2d 513 (1970). Very few such grants have been made. Rice 805-06.
Finally, the state has a long established practice of leasing submerged lands for the cultivation of
shellfish. Such leases are valid, but the ownership of the land remains in the state. See Id. at 794-
95, 803-04.
ON.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-205 (1966). This act was amended in 1971 to restrict the scope of
the registration requirement to coastal waters. Id. § 113-205 (Supp. 1971).
"Interview with Dr. Thomas Linton, Commissioner, North Carolina Bureau of Sport and
Commercial Fisheries, in Raleigh, N.C., May 18, 1972.
7See discussion in Rice 795.
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be settled on a case-by-case basis that considers the law in effect at the
time of the grant or sale in question. It is clear, however, that the private
claimant to tidal marshes has a heavy burden of proof. In State v.
Brooks,"8 the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that the private
party must carry the burden of showing a " 'connected chain of title
from the sovereign to (them) for the identical lands claimed by
(them).'-69 Any missing link in the chain of title will invalidate the
claim.7" It is doubtful whether many private claimants to marshland will
be able to meet this strict test.
7'
(b) Judicial Treatment of the Title Test. In order to determine the
present extent of state ownership of submerged lands, it is also necessary
to look at the state test for title in order to determine whether lands
originally owned by the state have passed into private ownership
through judicial construction. Two writers have extensively analyzed the
law of North Carolina regarding the issue of navigability to determine
title to submerged lands, and they have come to different conclusions.
Professor Rice,72 after a thorough review of the North Carolina cases,
concluded that the common law tidal ebb-and-flow test has been re-
jected by the North Carolina Supreme Court and that the navigable-
in-fact rule has become the single test of navigability. He defines the test
as "navigability in fact by any form of vessel or water transport com-
mon to the times. 13 Earnhardt, on the other hand, partially rejects
"279 N.C. 45, 181 S.E.2d 553 (1971).
'id. at 50, 181 S.E.2d at 556.
70Id. at 53, 181 S.E.2d at 557.
"Another factor in determining title is the extent of changes in boundaries or water levels due
to drainage and land fill operations, accretion, erosion, reliction and avulsion. The legal issues
involved are to be determined according to the law of the particular state within which the property
is located. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). If the state has expressly or impliedly acquiesced
in the filling of public trust lands, it may be estopped from asserting any public rights in the lands.
See City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970). North
Carolina and most other states follow the general rule that when the location of the margin of a
stream or other body of water which constitutes the boundary of a tract of' land is gradually
changed by accretion, erosion or reliction, the margin as changed remains the boundary line of
the tract. Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 304, 177
S.E.2d 513, 517 (1970). But title to land raised from navigable waters vests in the littoral or riparian
owner when he does the filling himself with the permission of the state or when the fill is for the
purpose of reclaiming lands lost by natural causes. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6 (1964).
"See Rice; Defining Navigable Waters. Studies have also been made of the laws of other states
on this issue. See Clineburg & Krahmer, The Law Pertaining to Estuarine Lands in South Caro-
lina, 23 S.C.L. REV. 7 (1971); Note, 5 GA. L. REV., supra note 46; Comment, Maryland's Wet-
lands: The Legal Quagmire, 30 MD. L. REV. 240 (1970).
"Rice 802.
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Rice's conclusion and states that the navigable-in-fact test may be sup-
plemental to the ebb-and-flow rule.7
4
Although the North Carolina law cannot be regarded as settled on
this issue, Earnhardt's view is probably correct. The navigable-in-fact
test was adopted to protect the state's title to the beds of inland naviga-
ble waters unaffected by the tides; the ebb-and-flow rule was rejected
only insofar as it would preclude state ownership of lands under inland
navigable waters. Tidal ebb and flow is still determinative of ownership
of the tidelands of the foreshore and the salt marshes unless there has
been a valid grant or conveyance by the state. Navigability-in-fact is the
test for title of inland non-tidal waters.
This conclusion is supported by the recent decision of the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town
of Carolina Beach,75 which was decided subsequent to Rice's article. In
that case the court was called upon to determine the dividing line be-
tween the property of the state and that of the littoral private owner.
The lands involved were shorelands fronting on the Atlantic Ocean. The
court held that with respect to the "foreshore," which it defined as "the
'strip of land between high-and-low-tide lines,' -17 private property ends
at the mean high tide mark .7 The court called this a "long established
rule.178
It is undeniable, therefore, that the ebb-and-flow test still has valid-
ity in North Carolina. The critical question is whether this rule is the
applicable test for title for all tidelands or has been limited in North
Carolina to ocean front lands. Although no certain answer can be given
until the matter is clarified by the North Carolina Supreme Court, there
are strong indications that the ebb-and-flow test for title is applicable
to all tidal areas. In Carolina Beach the court did not distinguish be-
tween ocean-front tidelands and other tidelands, 79 and such a distinction
would be very difficult to apply in practice. Moreover, in reaffirming
the mean-high-tide rule, the court cited a federal case, Borax Consoli-
7'Defining Navigable Waters 907.
75277 N.C. 297, 177 S.E.2d 513 (1970).
"IJd. at 301, 177 S.E.2d at 516.
7The court cited the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Borax Consol., Ltd. v.
City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935), in which it was held that mean high tide is the average
height of all the high waters at that place over a period of 18.6 years. Id. at 26-27.
78277 N.C. at 302, 177 S.E.2d at 516.
7rhe decision only involved oceanfront beachlands, however.
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dated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles."' This decision, in which the United States
Supreme Court defined the mean-high-tide rule, involved tidelands situ-
ated in the inner bay of San Pedro, now a part of Los Angeles Harbor .8
Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the North Carolina Supreme
Court has adopted a legal test for ownership that is more restrictive than
the common law test. The whole thrust of both federal and North
Carolina law has been to adopt a more expansive test for title than that
of English law. As early as 1828, the North Carolina Supreme Court
rejected the ebb-and-flow test as inapplicable to inland waters and stated
that such waters are navigable for title purposes if they are wide and
deep enough for "sea vessel" navigation.8 2 Yet the ebb-and-flow test was
applied to tidal waters in 1846.83 In State v. Glen,8 4 the court affirmed
the rejection of the ebb-and-flow test as the exclusive test of navigabil-
ity,85 but in a summary of the law, clearly stated a dual test of navigabil-
ity for title purposes. The "sea vessel" test applied to inland waters, but
the tidal test still applied to the "the shore . . . between the high and
low water" and to "all the bays and inlets on our coast, where the tide
from the sea ebbs and flows." 6
Decisions subsequent to Glen have modified this dual test some-
what but have kept it essentially intact. In Home Real Estate &
Insurance Co. v. Parmele,7 the court was called upon to determine the
ownership of two tracts of salt marsh beneath the waters of a tidal
sound. The court applied the "sea vessel" test of navigability and held
that the lands were not covered by navigable waters.88 This case has been
called the "first clear repudiation" of the common law ebb-and-flow
test, 9 but this is incorrect. The decision is consistent with Glen in that
the rejection of the tidal test is to emphasize that it is not the sole test
of navigability. But navigability by sea vessels was only one branch of
the legal test for title to submerged lands, and in Home Real Estate &
Insurance Co., the court clearly reaffirmed the ebb-and-flow test for
-296 U.S. 10 (1935).
"Id. at 12.
"Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. 30, 35 (1828). See also Collins v. Benbury, 25 N.C. 277 (1842).
"Hatfield v. Grimsted, 29 N.C. 139 (1846).
-a52 N.C. 321 (1859).
'lId. at 325.
11Id. at 333.
-214 N.C. 63, 197 S.E. 714 (1938).
8Id. at 68, 197 S.E. at 718.
"Rice 800.
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title and stated that "title to tidelands is in the state."9 The particular
parcels of tidelands involved were held to be in private ownership only
because they had been validly conveyed in fee by the state. The area was
held to be non-navigable only as a matter of interpretation of the rele-
vant statutory pattern which allowed grants and sales of marshland but
prohibited conveyances of lands under navigable waters. In the face of
direct statutory authorization giving the Literary Board and the Board
of Education the power to sell marshland, the court was compelled to
hold the area involved non-navigable under the statute.9 The Home
Real Estate & Insurance Co. case should not be interpreted, therefore,
as a complete rejection of the tidal test for determining state public trust
ownership of submerged lands.
The next significant North Carolina case, Resort Development Co.
v. Parm ele,92 reinterpreted the sea vessel navigation branch of the dual
test of public trust state ownership of submerged lands. The court stated
that the test of navigability was whether the waters are "navigable in
fact" and omitted the requirement in prior cases of sea vessel navigabil-
ity.93 Applying this test, the court stated that the area involved, marsh-
lands covered at high tide, was navigable-in-fact, presumably because
the waters adjoining the marshlands were capable of being used by
pleasure and commercial vessels." The court's holding, however, was
based on the ebb-and-flow test and clearly assumes that with regard to
the tidelands, the common law ebb-and-flow test for title survived the
rejection of the tidal test in the early cases involving non-tidal bays and
sounds. The court held that title to the marshlands was in the state and
could not have been granted by it under the laws existing in 1841, the
year in which the land was purported to be conveyed into private owner-
ship.9 The difference in the result of Home Real Estate & Insurance
Co. and Resort Development Co. can be explained not on the basis of
different approaches to the continuing validity of the ebb-and-flow test,
90214 N.C. at 68, 197 S.E. at 718.
"Id. at 69-70, 197 S.E. at 718-19. This was also the reason why the non-navigable marshlands
in Kelly v. King, 225 N.C. 709, 36 S.E.2d 220 (1945), were held to be privately owned.
92235 N.C. 689, 71 S.E.2d 474 (1952).
"Id. at 695, 71 S.E.2d at 479. The case is notable because it confuses the navigation for title
cases with the easement for navigation cases. See Rice 800.
"1235 N.C. at 691, 695, 71 S.E.2d at 476, 479; see Defining Navigable Waters 905.
'1235 N.C. at 696-97, 71 S.E.2d at 480. The early case of Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. 30 (1828),
"rejected" the tidal test, but the court assumes that the tidal test was in effect in 1841.
0235 N.C. at 697, 71 S.E.2d at 480.
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but because they involved different statutory limitations on the transfer
of public trust lands into private ownership.
A third Parmele case, Parmele v. Eaton,7 was decided by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in 1954. This case also involved tidal
marsh, and the court rejected the ebb-and-flow test and held that
navigability-in-fact is the rule in effect in North Carolina. 8 The case is
interesting because the court held non-navigable a portion of the same
marsh that was held navigable in Resort Development Co. Again, how-
ever, the seeming contradiction can be explained by the fact that the
grants to the private owners involved were made at different times under
different statutes. In Resort Development Co., the statute in effect at
the time of the grant was interpreted to limit grants of lands under
navigable waters under the common law rule,99 while in Parmele v.
Eaton the statutory limitation concerned grants of lands under waters
navigable-in-fact. "I The rejection of the tidal test in Eaton is thus
merely a matter of statutory construction and is not a rejection of the
test of state ownership in the absence of a valid grant by the state. In
Eaton, as in Home Real Estate & Insurance Co., title to the tidal
marshes was held to be in private hands because of a statutorily valid
conveyance by the state."0'
The North Carolina Supreme Court has thus adopted legal doc-
trine that is protective of the public trust lands owned by the state under
the federal test upon the formation of the Union. In the absence of a
valid transfer or grant by the state, the tidelands and lands under waters
navigable-in-fact are owned by the state. In no case has the North
Carolina Supreme Court rejected the theory that title to lands over
which the tide ebbs and flows, whether oceanfront or non-oceanfront,
was originally in the state irrespective of navigability-in-fact. In no case
has the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the theory that title to
land under waters navigable-in-fact was originally in the state, whether
affected by the tides or not. Thus a dual test of state title to submerged
lands prevails, and there has been no judicial abandonment of the public
trust in North Carolina.
-7240 N.C. 539, 83 S.E.2d 93 (1954).
931d. at 548, 83 S.E.2d at 99. A federal case, Swan Island Club, Inc. v. White, 114 F. Supp.
95 (E.D.N.C. 1953), affd, 209 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1954), also employed the navigable-in-fact test.
This doctrine has also received statutory sanction. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-64(4) (1964).
"235 N.C. at 696-97, 71 S.E.2d at 480.
110240 N.C. at 548, 83 S.E.2d at 99.
01d.
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B. Public Rights Not Derived from State Ownership.
It is obvious that important public rights are derived from state
ownership of the lands and waters of the coastal zone. To the extent of
its ownership, the state can protect and preserve these areas for the
public good.102 State ownership, however, is not the only source of public
rights. State law has long recognized several legal doctrines that provide
public rights in privately owned lands.
1. The Public Trust Doctrine. The history and background of
the public trust doctrine has been analyzed at length by several writ-
ers, 10 3 and detailed treatment of the subject is not necessary here. At
common law the doctrine operated as a source of public rights and as a
restraint upon the English sovereign's ownership of the sea and lands
over which the tide ebbed and flowed.0 4 Upon the formation of the
American Union, the original states succeeded to the ownership of these
lands as well as the restraints upon that ownership, as did the other
states upon their admission to the Union. 05 As stated above, the United
States Supreme Court, through its "rejection" of the ebb-and-flow test
for navigability, actually expanded the original public trust ownership
of the states to include not only tidelands but waters that are navigable-
in-fact." 6 The individual states as sovereigns, however, are free to con-
vey public trust lands'07 and to define the extent of the public rights in
such lands, 08 although the trust cannot be completely extinguished.'0'
North Carolina has accepted the public trust doctrine. In Shepard's
Point Land Co. v. Atlantic Hotel,"0 the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina quoted with approval the United States Supreme Court decision in
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois"' that the state has title to sub-
"'Private owners of lands riparian or littoral to navigable waters, however, have a right of
access to navigable water and the right to construct a pier or wharf as a means of passage from
the uplands to the water, but this right is only an easement and cannot be used to interfere with
the right of a member of the public to use navigable waters for recreational purposes. See Capune
v. Robins, 273 N.C. 581, 160 S.E.2d 881 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-12 (1964).
103Especially, see I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 33-44 (R. Clark ed. 1967); Sax, supra
note 26; Comment, 79 YALE L. J., supra note 21.
'01See discussion in Comment, 79 YALE L.J., supra note 21, at 768-69.
'°Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).




110132 N.C. 366, 44 S.E. 39 (1903).
"'146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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merged lands, but it is a title of a different character than that which it
holds in other lands. It is a title held in trust for the people of the state
so that they may navigate, fish, and carry on commerce in the waters
involved." 2 Although the extent of the public trust ownership of North
Carolina is confused and uncertain,"' the most reasonable interpreta-
tion of the cases is that the Supreme Court of North Carolina has
affirmed original state ownership of tidelands (whether marshland or
oceanfront) and lands under all waters navigable-in-fact,"' but has up-
held grants and conveyances of public trust lands, especially marsh-
lands, because of the statutory distinction in effect during most of the
state's history between navigable waters and non-navigable swamplands
and marshlands."
5
Assuming the validity of this analysis, the question then presented
is whether a valid grant or conveyance of public trust lands by the state
to a private party has the effect of completely extinguishing the public
rights that existed in those lands by virtue of the trust, or whether the
trust remains as a public easement on private property. The North
Carolina Supreme Court has not directly answered this question, al-
though it did approve the statement of the United States Supreme Court
in the Illinois Central case that the state can no more abdicate its trust
over such property than it can abandon its police powers and the preser-
vation of the peace."' Furthermore, the generally recognized rule in
other jurisdictions and among legal scholars is that the grantee of the
state cannot obtain a better title than his grantor and that private per-
sons obtain and hold such lands subject to the trust.17 The private
owner's title is thus severely restricted in that his use of the property
must be compatible with the rights of the public and cannot violate the
trust. What is a violation of the trust is an ad hoc judicial determination
depending on the facts of the particular case"8 and the extent of the
public trust according to state law. Some courts have allowed dredging
"'Shepard's Point Land Co. v. Atlantic Hotel, 132 N.C. 366, 372, 44 S.E. 39, 42 (1903).
"'See text accompanying notes 72-101 supra.
"'See text accompanying notes 72-86 supra.
"'See text accompanying notes 91-101 supra.
"'Shepard's Point Land Co. v. Atlantic Hotel, 132 N.C. 366, 373, 44 S.E. 39, 42 (1903).
"'See Township of Grosse Ile v. Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co., 15 Mich. App. 556, 167
N.W.2d 311 (1969); 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 36.4, at 197 (R. Clark ed. 1967); Defining
Navigable Waters 916.
"'Township of Grosse Ile v. Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co., 15 Mich. App. 556, _ , 167
N.W.2d 311, 316 (1969).
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and filling of such lands,"' but recent decisions in some states have
enjoined filling on privately owned lands as inconsistent with public
rights. 20
The California Supreme Court recently defined the scope of public
rights in privately held trust land. In Marks v. Whitney,' the court,
after declaring that privately held tidelands are burdened with a public
easement for trust purposes, stated that the easement has been tradition-
ally defined to include "the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for
boating and general recreation purposes.'1 2 The court also indicated
that the public trust is a flexible doctrine that encompasses changing
public needs. One of the most important aspects of the trust is the
"preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may
serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as
environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life,
and which favorably affect the scenery and the climate of the area.'
2 3
It is unclear whether the North Carolina Supreme Court would
accept such a broad characterization of the public trust doctrine. It is
probable, however, that at least the traditionally defined public ease-
ment burdens privately held trust lands in North Carolina. 2 1 If so, the
controversy over title to these lands 25 is less significant. Public rights
exist and should be maintained regardless of public or private owner-
ship.
2. Public Rights in Waters Over Non-Public Trust Lands. In
states following the ebb-and-flow and commercial navigability-in-fact
tests for public trust lands, a question may arise concerning the right of
the public to use, particularly for recreational purposes, waters that are
non-navigable for title purposes, but which can be used by small boats.
A minority of states follow the English common law rule that the public
has no rights to use such waters for recreational purposes against the
"'See Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. City of Alameda, 264 Cal. App. 2d 284, 70 Cal. Rptr.
264, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 906 (1968).
12 0Township "of Grosse lie v. Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co., 15 Mich. App, 556, 167
N.W.2d 311 (1969); Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 878 (1970); see Comment, Private Fills in Navigable Waters: A Connon Law Approach,
60 CALIF. L. REv. 225 (1972).
1216 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
'2Id. at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
'DId. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
124See State v. Twiford, 136 N.C. 603, 48 S.E. 586 (1904).
1See text accompanying notes 72-101 supra.
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owner's objection." 6 Most states, however, allow public use of such
waters even though the bed is in private ownership. The extent of the
public right depends on the legal theory adopted. Public rights have been
upheld for policy considerations, 27 as an incident of state ownership of
the overlying waters, 2 because the beds of waters suitable for recreation
are impressed with a public trust for that purpose, 1 9 and because of a
public easement of recreation and navigation. 30
North Carolina has adopted the public easement theory. In a series
of cases involving obstructions to navigation, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court affirmed the public's right to use waters beyond those that
are navigable for title or public trust purposes; 3' the court developed
another concept of navigability for the purpose of determining when
obstructions for navigation should be abated. The broadest formulation
of this test was in State v. Twiford,32 in which the court quoted with
approval the statement that a public easement exists if water is naviga-
ble for pleasure boating even though no craft has been put upon it for
trade or agriculture. In later cases, however, especially those in which
the North Carolina Supreme Court announced the navigable-in-fact test
for title, the public easement cases were confused with the title cases,
33
and the court has not since clarified the distinction between these two
different concepts of navigability.
3. Public Rights and Interests in Uplands in the Coastal
Zone. Much of the land in the coastal zone of North Carolina is in
state or federal ownership. Obviously, these lands can be administered
with a view toward protecting the resources of the area in the interest
of the public. When lands are privately held, no rights of public use can
12 The cases are collected in Comment, Water Recreation-Public Use of"Private" Waters,
52 CALIF. L. REv. 171, 172 (1964).
'"Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933 (Okla. 1969).
12uState Game & Fish Comm'n v. Louis Fritz Co., 187 Miss. 539, 193 So. 9 (1940); State v.
Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo.
1961).
'Kerley v. Wolfe, 349 Mich. 350, 84 N.W.2d 748 (1957); Branch v. Oconto County, 13 Wis.
2d 595, 109 N.W.2d 105 (1961).
'Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1951); see Fairchild v. Kraemer,
I I App. Div. 2d 232, 204 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1960).
1'3 For a good discussion see Rice 803.
132136 N.C. 603, 48 S.E. 586 (1904).
'See Swan Island Club v. White, 114 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1953); Parmele v. Eaton, 240
N.C. 539, 83 S.E.2d 93 (1954); Resort Dev. Co. v. Parmele, 235 N.C. 689, 71 S.E.2d 474 (1952);
Rice 800.
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be created by the state without compensation. 134 However, land use
regulations and restrictions can be adopted to prevent undesirable devel-
opment. 135 Furthermore, common law doctrines may provide a basis
for public rights on certain privately owned uplands such as beaches and
shorelands. In State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,' the Supreme Court of
Oregon held that by reason of the common law doctrine of custom,' 7
the public had acquired an easement to use the dry sand area between
high tide and the line of visible vegetation on all the beaches along the
Oregon coast. 3' As a result, private owners are prohibited from enclos-
ing the beach, building improvements, or doing anything to interfere
with free public access for recreational purposes.' 3' The court also
declared a policy in favor of the creation of prescriptive easements in
beach land for public recreational use.'40 The California Supreme Court
employed a third common law doctrine to find public recreational rights
in shorelands. In Gion v. City of Santa Cruz,"' it was held that five
years of uninterrupted recreational use by the public constituted an
implied dedication by the owners to the public for such use.' These
common law doctrines have not yet been applied to beach lands in
North Carolina.
43
'U.S. CONST. amend. V. The prohibition against taking private lands without compensation
has been held to apply to the states by reason of the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & 0.
R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897). Most state constitutions contain a similar provision.
'sZoning regulations have been upheld even though they may diminish the value of one's
property. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20
Cal. Rptr. 638, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 36 (1962); In re Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 56, 197 S.E. 706, 710
(1938). For a complete discussion of the line between regulation and taking see Michelman,
Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
'11254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
'37The court, paraphrasing Sir William Blackstone, set out six requirements of custom: (1)
long and general usage, (2) without interruption, (3) peaceable and free, (4) reasonable, (5) certain
and (6) uniform. Id. at 595-97, 462 P.2d at 677.
11'1d. at 587, 462 P.2d at 673.
"'Id. at 587-88, 462 P.2d at 673.
"Old. at 594, 462 P.2d at 676.
"'2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970) (per curiam).
"'Id. at 43,465 P.2d at 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 171; see Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 564 (1970).
"'The doctrine of dedication, which is the intentional appropriation of land by the owner to
some public use, is a part of the law of North Carolina. Spaugh v. City of Charlotte, 239 N.C.
f49, 79 S.E.2d 748 (1954). However, a dedication to the public must be accepted by a duly
constituted governmental authority. Oliver v. Ernul, 277 N.C. 591, 178 S.E.2d 393 (1971). Pre-
scriptive easements are also recognized in North Carolina, but the use must be open, adverse, under
claim of right and without consent of the owner. Colvin v. Tallassee Power Co., 199 N.C. 353,
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II. GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY IN THE COASTAL ZONE
A. Existing Patterns of Legislation
Authority over the coastal zone environment is presently divided
among many different agencies of the federal, state and local govern-
ments. Typically, agencies and units of government exercise authority
that is limited both geographically and substantively. Thus, counties and
municipalities have primary control over land-use regulations and solid
waste disposal, and separate state agencies are responsible for adminis-
tering programs for water and air pollution control, water use, highways
and transportation, and the sale and lease of state-owned lands. The
natural consequence: of this fragmented pattern of control is a lack of
coordination in governmental decisionmaking and ignorance of the sig-
nificance and complexity of coastal zone problems."'
In recent years, however, coastal states have enacted statutes spe-
cifically directed toward estuarine and wetland conservation."' North
Carolina recently enacted comprehensive legislation to protect sand
dunes and marshlands. The Board of Water and Air Resources is au-
thorized to establish a shoreland protection line and to adopt regulations
for protection in any county that had not done so by IDecember 31,
1971.111 Any person who wishes to carry out any excavation or filling
project in any estuarine waters, tidelands, marshlands or state-owned
lakes must obtain a permit from the Department of Conservation and
Development. 47 The permit can be denied if there will be ali adverse
effect on the use of the water by the public, the value and enjoyment of
the property of any riparian owners, the public health, safety and wel-
fare, the conservation of public and private water supplies, or on wildlife
and fisheries resources.' The Director of the Department of Conserva-
tion and Development also has authority after holding public hearings
to adopt orders protecting specific marshlands as well as contiguous
154 S.E. 678 (1930). The common law doctrine of custom is probably the most useful concept for
the protection of public rights in the dry sand area of the beaches. See discussion in State ex rel.
Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 595-99, 462 P.2d 671, 676-78 (1969).
"'See Ducsik, The Crisis in Shoreline Recreation Lands, in PAPERS 107, 128.
"'See E. BRADLEY & J. ARMSTRONG, A DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF COASTAL AND
SHORELAND MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (Univ. of Michigan Sea Grant
Technical Report No. 20, 1972).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 104B-16 (1972).
111d. § 113-229(a) (Supp. 1971).
1'1d. § 113-229(e) (Supp. 1971).
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uplands,' but at this writing the authority has not been used.," The
General Assembly of North Carolina has also appropriated funds for
the acquisition of estuarine lands threatened with development", and
has authorized the preparation of a long range plan for estuarine conser-
vation and management.
5 2
Controls adopted in other states vary greatly. Florida law author-
izes cities or counties to designate bulkhead lines along or offshore from
tidal lands, beyond which no filling or bulkheading is allowed. These
bulkhead lines are subject to the approval of the Trustees of the Internal
Fund, composed of the Governor and six state cabinet officers.' In
addition, the 1972 Florida legislature passed several bills establishing
statewide land-use planning that requires local governments to adopt
regulations guiding development in critical areas and with respect to
developments of regional impact.'54 This legislation is, of course, applic-
able to the Florida coastal zone. Georgia prohibits alteration of any
marshland within the estuarine area of the state without a permit from
the Coastal Marshlands Protection Agency.155 Maryland prohibits
dredging or filling on state-owned wetlands without a permit from the
Board of Public Works and authorizes the promulgation of rules and
regulations governing the alteration of private wetlands. 5  Maine, 7
Massachusetts, 5 ' Rhode Island,'59 and Connecticut 60 also regulate de-
velopment and alteration of coastal marshlands. Delaware has a unique
law that entirely prohibits heavy industry and offshore gas, liquid or
solid bulk product transfer facilities along the entire coast of the state.'0'
Other manufacturing uses and the expansion of nonconforming in-
dustrial uses are allowed only after a permit has been obtained from the
111d. § 113-230 (Supp. 1971).
' 'Interview with Dr. Thomas Linton, supra note 66.
'Heath, Estuarine Conservation Legislation in the States, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 351,
357 (1970).
'52Ch. 1164, [1969] N.C. Sess. L. 1343-44.
'1FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 253.122.123 (1962).
'Fla. Sess. L. Serv. ch. 72-295, 72-300, 72-317 (1972).
10GA. CODE ANN. § 45-140(a) (Supp. 1971); see Note, 5 GA. L. REV., supra note 46.
'MD. ANN. CODE art. 66c, §§ 721-22 (1970); see Comment, 30 MD. L. REV., supra note 72.
'57ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4701-09 (Supp. 1970).
... MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, § 27A (1972); see F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, TIlE
QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL 205-26 (1971).
'R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 2-1-13 to -24 (Supp. 1971).
'60CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-7h to-70 (Supp. 1972).
"'DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7001 (1971). For a good analysis of this legislation see Note,
Legislation-The Delaware Coastal Zone Act, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 481 (1972).
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State Planner."' An application for a permit must be accompanied by
an environmental impact statement evaluating the effect of the proposed
use on the natural resources, water quality, fisheries, wildlife, and aes-
thetics of the area."6 3 Any person aggrieved by a decision of the State
Planner can appeal to a ten-member State Coastal Zone Industrial
Control Board. 64 Washington, through a 1971 law, requires local gov-
ernments having jurisdiction over shorelines of statewide significance to
adopt a master program for the regulation of the shorelines in accord-
ance with guidelines issued by the state.'65
The federal government has not yet enacted a law dealing with the
protection of the coastal zone, but the Rivers and Harbors Act prohibits
excavating or filling navigable waters of the United States without a
permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers. 66 In Zabel v.
Tabb,6 7 the Fifth Circuit held that a permit under the Rivers and Har-
bors Act can be withheld to protect the ecology of the area involved
under the authority of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act'6' and the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.69
B. Future Controls: Comprehensive Coastal Zone Management
Although in most states special legislation relating to the coastal
zone has only recently been enacted, new and even more comprehensive
laws are being developed. The impetus for a more complete approach
is coming largely from the federal government. At this writing the
United States Senate has passed a bill to establish a national program
for the management, beneficial use, protection, and development of the
land and water resources of the nation's coastal zone,7 0 and almost
identical legislation has been passed in the House of Representatives.
7'
Although the details of the program will not be clear until a final bill
112DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7005 (1971).
AId. tit. 7, § 7002(c).
'61d. tit. 7, § 7007(b).
'WASH. REV. CODE ANN. app. § 90.286x (Supp. 1971), as amended Wash. Legislative Serv.
ch. 53 (1972).
"C833 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
167430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
16516 U.S.C. §§ 661-66c (1970).
16942 U.S.C. §§ 4331-47 (1970).
IS. 3507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); 118 CONG. REc. S 6672 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1972).
President Nixon has also proposed tax incentives to limit development in the coastal wetlands. See
THE PRESIDENT'S 1972 ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM 95 (Council on Environmental Quality 1972).
"7H. R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); 118 CONG. REc. H 7087 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1972).
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has been agreed upon and passed, the general thrust of the federal effort
can be predicted. The states will continue to have primary responsibility
for coastal zone protection, but Federal money will be provided to
coastal states for the development and operation of coastal zone man-
agement programs,7 3 and the states will be assisted in the acquisition
and operation of estuarine sanctuaries.77 The federal legislation will
specify in general the components of state management programs,," and
to be eligible for continued federal aid, each management program must
be approved by the Secretary of Commerce.' A state must adopt an
adequate institutional structure for the administration of its program
with the authority to effectuate the controls established.
7
It is thus likely that all of the coastal states of the nation will soon
be enacting comprehensive coastal zone management legislation under
the watchful eye of the federal government. This alone, however, does
not ensure the success of the project. Unless the new laws are well
conceived and carried out, the coastal zone management program will
go the way of other federal-state programs for environment protection
such as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1965,'78which has
been universally criticized as inadequate.' Since the pending federal
bills leave the details of coastal zone management to the states, it will
be on this level that the battle will be won or lost. It is the purpose of
this article to suggest appropriate policies to guide state action.
1. Protection of Existing Public Rights. The point of departure
in the coastal zone management program of any state should be the
recognition that under traditional common law principles, important
172S. 3507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 302(h) (1972); H.R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 302(h)
(1972).
171S. 3507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 305(a) (1972); H.R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 305(a)
(1972).
S. 3507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 313(a) (1972); H.R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 312(a)
(1972).
175S. 3507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 305(b) (1972); H.R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 305(b)
(1972).
17S. 3507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 306(c)-(d) (1972); H.R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
§§ 306(c)-(d) (1972).
177S. 3507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 305(b)(6) (1972); H.R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 305(b)(6)
(1972).
17933 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970).
'Especially, see Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Pollution
Control Act. A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 1103
(1970); Hines, Controlling Industrial Water Pollution: Color the Problem Green, 9 B.C. IND. &
CoMi. L. REv. 553 (1968).
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public rights exist in the lands and waters of the coastal area. These
rights, which the public possesses by reason of state ownership of sub-
merged lands, the public trust doctrine, custom, and public easement,
are at present only vaguely defined and sporadically enforced.80 As part
of the program for coastal zone management, each state should legisla-
tively define and assert existing public rights in the coastal area, declare
a policy of protecting such rights and direct the attorney general or some
other appropriate official to strictly construe and enforce the rights of
the public.
2. Objectives, Policies and Goals. Ideally, the development of a
coastal zone management program should be accompanied by the for-
mulation of certain objectives, policies and goals, and the program
should be implemented according to them. Once these have been agreed
upon, the planning and decision-making process can be structured so as
to attain them.
Unfortunately, goal-setting is not an easy task. Theorists on plan-
ning and decisionmaking point out that a planning strategy that at-
tempts to derive explicit objectives as a first step in the process are
doomed to failure.'' Moreover, in the management of coastal zone
resources, no single goal will be judged acceptable; several conflicting
objectives will be identified, and the debate on goal-setting will center
on the importance to be given to particular objectives when they come
into conflict.8 2 Another difficulty is the lack of data with respect to the
interactions of the natural, economic and social systems of the coastal
zone.8 3 In addition, the scientific development of goals and objectives
for planning is relatively new, 8 4 and existing governmental units and
agencies responsible for the coastal zone often have different and con-
flicting policy objectives.8 5
Attempts are now underway to remedy this problem and to develop
objectives to guide decisionmaking in the coastal zone. For example, in
North Carolina research is being conducted by Professor Hufschmidt
"'See R. DEWSNUP, PUBLIC ACCESS RIGHTS IN WATERS AND SHORELANDS 47-54 (1971).
IslHufschmidt, Knox & Parker, A Policy Analysis Approach: Objectives, Alternative Devel-
opment Strategies and Econometric Models, in COASTAL ZONE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 104, 109
(J. Hite & J. Stepp eds. 1971).
111d. at 107.
" Kissin, Analysis, in COASTAL ZONE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 121, 124 (J. Hite & J. Stepp
eds. 1971).
"'HufsChmidt, Knox & Parker, supra note 181, at I 11.
18Jld. at 107.
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of the University of North Carolina to develop an approach and metho-
dology to guide decisionmaking in the coastal zone.' Professor Huf-
schmidt and his associates have reviewed the prior experience of North
Carolina governmental units in developing goals statements 8 They
plan to prepare a preliminary set of goals from existing federal and state
legislation, to develop patterns of management of the coastal zone in
conformity with the different sets of objectives, and to apply techniques
of systems analysis, including econometric models, physical models,
simulation and mathematical programming methods, to the objective
sets."'88 A comprehensive development and management strategy would
be evolved, with investments scheduled over time and with environmen-
tal data monitored.
89
The development of such sophisticated policy-analysis techniques
will, however, take many years. The crucial question is whether the
passage of legislation providing for management of the coastal zone
should await a more precise formulation of policy objectives and sys-
tems analysis. Obviously, it should not. Since law seldom operates as a
neutral rule or doctrine but is usually the embodiment of societal poli-
cies and objectives, failure to enact new laws merely perpetuates out-
dated policy objectives that are either affirmatively furthered or implic-
itly accepted by existing law. Existing law in large measure still reflects
the idea that coastal wetlands are wastelands that should be drained and
developed." Furthermore, the lack of a coastal management law re-
flects in large measure implicit approval of the economic theory that
decisions regarding the allocation of coastal resources are to be made
by the "invisible hand" of the private market, which puts a premium
on short-term private profit and which undervalues public goods and
long range needs. 9' These old policies must be immediately reversed
without waiting for the refinement of decision-making techniques.
The new policy of the law that should be the guiding principle of
the coast zone management progam is that land and water use should
11Id. at 104-05.
111970-71 UNIV. OF N.C. SEA GRANT PROBLEM ANN. REP. 27.
'8 8Hufschmidt, Knox & Parker, supra note 181, at 108-109.
'OId. at 112-13.
'"With the enactment in many states of laws controlling development in the coastal wetlands,
some shift in legal policy is evident, but most of the laws regulating man's activities in the coastal
zone are still merely intended to protect and serve individual and group interests in dealing with




be controlled and guided so that it does not exceed the capability of the
land for development based on ecological considerations.9 2 This princi-
ple of land-use planning accommodates both environmental and devel-
opmental values. Land capability considerations would include such
factors as geology, hydrology, historic sites, scenic vistas, air quality,
unique natural areas, ecosystems, population distribution and settle-
ment patterns.9 3 The lands and waters of the coastal zone should be
classified according to this principle. This would result in the designa-
tion of some areas as able to sustain generalized land use; while other
areas would be considered too fragile or unique for any development;
still others would be suitable for limited developmental purposes.
The importance of this new policy objective cannot be underesti-
mated. It is a rejection of the narrow view of land as just another
commodity that is of value only to the extent of its market price. The
new idea of land is that it is an irreplaceable and limited resource that
must not be impaired. 9 ' A corollary of this proposition is that the
traditional view that the sole purpose of land use regulation is to pre-
serve and maximize economic value is no longer valid; the new purpose
of land and water use regulation is to preserve resources. 95
3. The Institutional Structure. There will be understandable com-
petition among existing state agencies and their administrators for the
responsibility for coastal zone management. The most critical consider-
ation, however, is not what-agency should be chosen, but rather how to
ensure that the coastal zone management agency has the powers and the
tools to carry out the program. It is obvious that in order to be effective,
the agency must not be fashioned according to the traditional model of
the regulatory body which makes ad hoc decisions in accordance with
standards set out by the state legislature.
The primary function of the coastal zone agency must be the devel-
opment of the land and water capability data and the adoption, after
full opportunity for public participation, of a comprehensive but flexible
coastal land-use plan. This planning function can serve not only to guide
" This policy is an integral part of the recently enacted Vermont Environmental Control Law
which establishes a system of state-wide land use planning. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-91
(Supp. 1971).
" 3These considerations are used in Vermont. See, F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, supra note




NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW
decisionmaking but also as a vehicle for coordinating the decisions and
activities of the other state and local traditional regulatory agencies that
operate in the coastal zone. At present these agencies are "mission-
oriented" and often act at cross purposes. By requiring all agency deci-
sions to conform to the land capability plans of the coastal zone man-
agement agency, this problem would be alleviated. For example, a water
pollution control agency in issuing a discharge permit-even as to a
point upstream on a river that enters the coastal zone-should be re-
quired to consider whether it would infringe minimum water quality
parameters adopted as part of the plan for the coastal zone. Operating
agencies should, of course, have a voice in the formulation of the plan,
particularly in their area of expertise, but once it has been adopted by
the management agency, they should be required to conform to it.
The coastal zone management agency also must have the power to
control land-use decisions in the coastal area, but not in the traditional
regulatory sense. It must have the power to work with private developers
so that land use will not infringe the capacity of the land to accept
development. It should also have the power of eminent domain to ac-
quire lands where development is undesirable and cannot be prohibited
without infringing on private property rights. The coastal zone manage-
ment agency should also have the power to borrow money and issue
bonds so that it may construct and maintain public facilities, such as
wastewater treatment plants and solid waste recycling systems.
4. The Role of Local Government. The pending federal legisla-
tion to establish a national policy for coastal zone management will
require the states to exercise some control over local control of land and
water uses, but will largely leave each state free to develop a method
for doing this.9 ' In most of the municipalities and some counties of the
coastal zone, local regulation of land use has been in existence for many
years, and it would not be desirable or politically feasible to by-pass this
system. Perhaps the best solution to the problem is that recommended
by the American Law Institute.9 7 As it points out, fully ninety percent
of the land-use decisions currently being made by local governments
have no major effect on the state or national interest." 8 These decisions
should continue to be made on the local level, subject only to adminis-
trative review by the coastal zone management agency. Only the re-
"'S. 3507 Cong., 2d Sess. § 306(e) (1972); H.R. 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 306(c) (1972).
"
7MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1971).
119d., Commentary at 5.
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maining ten percent of the land use decisions, those of national, regional
or state importance, should be directly controlled by the coastal zone
management agency. Even as to these decisions, the determination in
most cases could be made in the first instance by the local government
or by a regional board with appeals handled by the state-level commis-
sion.'99 But the problem of distinguishing decisions of only local signifi-
cance from those of regional or national significance is not an easy one.
The American Law Institute has proposed three criteria for defining
decisions of national or regional concern: (1) land-use decisions which
affect geographical areas in which future development is an issue of
statewide concern because of natural resources or the characteristics of
development that have already occurred; (2) major developments such
as airports, major highways, public utility transmission lines which by
their very nature become matters of state concern; and (3) some types
of development which have only a local impact if undertaken on a small
scale but are of state concern when undertaken on a large scale.
2
11
5. The Problem of Taking of Private Property Rights. An over-
riding problem of any state coastal zone management program is that
of operating within the constitutional prohibition against taking prop-
erty for a public use without just compensation. 21 Some restrictions on
use will undoubtedly be so severe that interests in land will have to be
acquired by the agency through purchase or eminent domain in order
to avoid infringing constitutional rights. The vast bulk of decisions,
however, should not present such a problem. Several different ap-
proaches can be used to obviate the taking issue. First, when regulation
is for the purpose of protecting existing public rights under the public
trust doctrine, custom, or the doctrine of a public easement for recrea-
tion, the taking issue should not arise.2 12 Second, tests developed by the
United States Supreme Court and state courts have upheld regulatory
provisions that result in greatly diminishing the value of private prop-
erty, if the regulation is essential to promote public health or safety.0 3
Third, the line between taking and regulation has never been clearly
defined by the courts, and new theories have been proposed to accom-
'Id., Commentary at 6.
211Id., Commentary at 5-6.
2'U.S. CONST. amend. V.
rrhis can be a powerful theory for upholding the constitutionality of both present and future
legislation limiting development in the coastal wetlands. See text accompanying notes 124-25
supra; Note 5 GA. L. REv., supra note 46 at 582.
113See cases cited notes 134-35 supra.
19721
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
modate management of natural resources and the constitutional prohi-
bition. Professor Sax has argued that present law is anomalous and
inconsistently applied and has proposed a new law of takings that would
allow compensation only if the governmentally imposed constraint dis-
criminates among equally situated property owners or if it presents
property owners from engaging in profitable uses that do not have
substantial spillover effects conflicting with public rights."0 4 Fourth, if
compensation must be paid, it may be possible to acquire an interest in
the land less than complete title, such as an easement or development
rights, if this is equitable.0 5 Fifth, money could be raised to compensate
affected persons by taxing those whose property value is increased by
the coastal land-use plan or by a small ad valorem tax on all private
property in the state.206
III. CONCLUSION
Land and water use planning for the purpose of protecting re-
sources is a new departure for American law and presents new chal-
lenges. Because of the unique character of the coastal zones of the
nation, it is appropriate to begin to construct a management program
in that area. The new coastal zone legislation should, however, take into
account the substantial rights possessed by the public under traditional
legal principles. These rights have been poorly enforced in the past. In
addition, a coastal zone agency should be created to manage the coastal
area so as not to exceed the environmental limits of development. The
agency must not be constructed according to the traditional model of
the specialized, regulatory administrative agency. It should have a plan-
ning function as well as a regulatory purpose, and it should be inte-
grated, with broad powers in many-different areas. In this way, order
can be brought forth out of the chaos that now characterizes govern-
mental and private decisionmaking affecting the coastal zone.
2'Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
2F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, supra note 158, at 324.
20See R. WILKINSON, supra note 193, at 34-35.
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APPENDIX:
A BILL TO BE ENTITLED AN AcT RELATING TO MANAGEMENT
OF THE COASTAL ZONE OF NORTH CAROLINAt
Section 1. Short Title. This Act shall be known as the Coastal Zone Management Act of
1973.
Section 2. Legislative Findings and Goals.
(1) Legislative Findings. The legislature finds that many of North Carolina's most valuable
resources are found in the coastal areas of the state. Coastal and estuarine waters and marshlands
are responsible for almost ninety percent of North Carolina's commercial fisheries' harvest. North
Carolina's coast is also very rich in sport fisheries resources and has extremely high value for other
recreational activities. The coastal zone encompasses unique and fragile ecosystems which must
be preserved. It is the policy of this state, and indeed, by the recent ratification by its citizens of
Article XIV, section 51 of the Constitution, a mandate to this legislature, that means be provided
for the conservation of these resources-economic, biological, recreational.
In recent years the coastal zone has been subject to increasing pressures which are the result
of the often conflicting needs of a society expanding in industrial development, in population, and
in the recreational aspirations of its citizens. Unless these pressures are rationalized and channeled
by co-ordinated management schemes, the very features of the coast which make it productive
economically, attractive for recreation purposes, and ecologically rich will be destroyed. The
legislature therefore finds that an immediate and pressing necessity exists to establish a comprehen-
sive plan for the protection, preservation, orderly development, and management of the coastal
region of North Carolina.
In the implementation of this plan, the public's opportunity to enjoy the physical and recrea-
tional qualities of natural shorelines of the state shall be preserved to the greatest extent feasible;
water resources shall be managed in order to reverse the deterioration of water quality and to
provide optimum utilization of water resources; land resources shall be managed in order to guide
growth and development and to minimize damage to the natural environment; and private property
rights shall be preserved in accord with the constitution of this state and of the United States.
(2) Goals of the Coastal Zone Management System. The goals of the coastal zone manage-
ment system are as follows:
(a) To insure that the development of the land and water resources of the coastal
zone proceeds in a manner consistent with the capability of the land and waters for
development and use based on ecological considerations;
(b) To insure the orderly and balanced use of our coastal resources on behalf of
the people of North Carolina and the nation;
(c) To establish clear-cut policies, guidelines, and standards for all potential uses
of the coastal zone;
(d) To develop institutional arrangements to accomplish the above objectives
which focus responsibility, provide viable means for implementation and review, and
assure response to public will and purpose.
Section 3. Definitions. As used in this Act:
(I) Authority means: The Coastal Zone Authority created by Section 5 of this Act.
(2) Coastal Zone means: That area of land and waters from the most inland extent of
"Marianne K. Smythe, a second year law student at the School of Law or the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, was the co-draftsman of this bill. Peter Glenn, Assistant Professor
of Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill offered many helpful suggestions, as
did John C. Boger, a second year law student.
'This new section of the North Carolina Constitution will be voted upon by the people on
November 7, 1972. If approved, it will become effective on January 1, 1973.
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substantial maritime influences seaward to the territorial limit.
(3) Commission means: The State Coastal Resources Planning Commission created by
Section 4 of this Act.
(4) Critical Area means: Those areas of critical state concern designated by the Commission,
pursuant to the provisions of Section 7 of this Act.
(5) Development means:
(a) Any use involving, requiring, or consisting of the construction or exterior
alteration of a structure; dredging; filling; drilling; dumping; removal of sand, gravel or
minerals; bulkheading; driving of pilings; clearing of land as an adjunct of construction;
alteration or removal of sand dunes; alteration of the shore or bank of any river, creek,
stream, lake, pond, or canal.
(b) The following uses shall not be deemed to be development under this Section:
(i) work by a highway or road agency or railroad company for the maintenance
or improvement of an existing road or railroad track, if the work is carried out on land
within the boundaries of the right-of-way;
(ii) work by any utility and other persons engaged in the distribution and trans-
mission of gas, water, or electricity for the purpose of inspecting, repairing, renewing,
or constructing on established rights-of-way any sewers, mains, pipes, cables, utility
tunnels, powerlines, towers, poles, tracks, and the like;
(iii) the use of any land for the purpose of planting or harvesting plants, crops,
trees, and other agricultural or forestry products, raising livestock, or for other agricul-
tural purposes where no dredging or filling is involved;
(iv) work for the maintenance, renewal, alteration, or improvement of any
structure if the work affects only the interior or the color of the structure or the exterior
decoration of the structure;
(v) the construction of an accessory building customarily incident to an existing
structure if the work does not involve filling, dredging, or the alteration of any sand
dune.
(6) Development of regional impact means: Developments defined by the rules promulgated
by the Commission pursuant to Section 8.
(7) Legislature means: The General Assembly of North Carolina.
(8) Local government means: Any county, incorporated city, or town which contains within
its boundaries any lands or waters subject to this chapter.
(9) Local permit-granting authority means: Whichever body is designated by the applicable
zoning ordinance to have the authority to grant special use permits and variances for the local
government. In the absence of special authority the elected legislative officials of the local govern-
ment shall be deemed the applicable permit-granting authority.
(10) Person means: An individual, citizen, partnership, corporation, association, organiza-
tion, business trust, estate, trust, public or municipal corporation, or agency of the state or local
government unit, or any other legal entity however designated.
(1I) Rule means: A statement, policy, or requirement of general application adopted by the
Coastal Resources Planning Commission pursuant to the authority given said Commission by
Sections 7 and 8 of this Act.
(12) Statement means: The comprehensive document for coatsal zone management prepared
by the Coastal Zone Planning Commission pursuant to Section 6.
Section 4. State Coastal Resources Planning Commission.
(I) Creation: The legislature hereby establishes a council to be designated the Coastal Re-
sources Planning Commission.
(2) Composition: The Coastal Resources Planning Commission shall consist of eighteen (18)
members appointed or designated as follows:
(a) The Secretary of the Department of Natural and Economic Resources and two
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(2) other members of the Department to be chosen by the Secretary;
(b) The Secretary of the Department of Administration and two (2) other mem-
bers of that Department to be chosen by the Secretary;
(c) The Secretary of the Department of Human Resources and one (1) other
member to be chosen by the Secretary;
(d) The Secretaries, or Commissioners, of
(i) the Department of Agriculture;
(ii) the Department of Transportation and Highway Safety;
(iii) the Department of Commerce; and
(iv) the Department of Art, Culture, and History;
(e) One member from each house of the North Carolina General Assembly to be
appointed by the Governor;
(f) One member from each of the four multi-county planning districts of the
coastal zone to be appointed by the lead regional agency of each district.
(g) The legislature recommends that those Secretaries or Commissioners empow-
ered to designate additional members of the Commission select officials with particular
interest or expertise in matters relating to coastal concerns.
(h) The Governor shall appoint and fix the salary of an executive director of the
Commission who shall serve at his pleasure.
(3) Duties of the Commission:
(a) To prepare and adopt a Statement for Coastal Zone Management in accord-
ance with the provisions of Section 6 of this Act;
(b) To designate by rule areas of critical state concern pursuant to Section 7 of
this Act;
(c) After the adoption of the Statement to reconstitute itself at five year intervals
to examine the implementation and administration of the Statement and to adopt any
necessary amendments to the Statement pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of this
Act.
Section 5. Coastal Zone Authority.
(1) There is hereby created and established within the Department of Natural and Economic
Resources an Authority to be known as the Coastal Zone Authority.
(2) Composition: The Coastal Zone Authority shall consist of a chairman and six (6)
members appointed by the Governor as follows:
(a) One who shall, at the time of appointment, be actively connected with and havb
experience in commercial or sport fisheries resources;
(b) One who shall, at the time of appointment, be actively connected with in-
dustrial production and have experience in the field of industrial air, water, and noise
pollution control;
(c) One who shall, at the time of appointment, have special training and expertise
in marine and coastal ecology;
(d) One who shall, at the time of appointment, have special training and expertise
in the problems of land-use planning;
(e) Three (3) members interested in the orderly development and conservation of
coastal resources, appointed from the public at large, provided that no such public
member shall be an employee, officer, or representative of any industry, business, or
political subdivision which may fall under the jurisdiction or be directly affected by the
authority created by this Act.
(3) The members shall serve in staggered terms of office of six (6) years. In the event of a
vacancy the Governor shall appoint a successor of like qualification who shall then serve the
remainder of his predecessor's term. At the expiration of each member's term, the Governor shall
replace the member with a new member of like qualifications. A member who has served one term
34 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
may serve one other term provided that the terms are not consecutive. The initial terms shall be
determined by the Governor in accordance with customary practice, but one of the three public
members shall be appointed for two years, another for four years, and a third for six years.
(4) The office of a member of the Coastal Zone Authority is declared to be an office that
may not be held concurrently with any other elective or appointive office, under the authority of
Article VI, § 9 of the North Carolina Constitution.
(5) Compensation: The members of the Authority shall receive the usual and customary per
diem payment allowed for the other members of Boards and Commissions of the State and as fixed
in the Biennial Appropriation Act, and, in addition, the members shall receive subsistence and
travel expenses according to the prevailing state practices and as allowed and fixed by statute for
such purposes, which said travel expenses shall also be allowed while going to or from any place
of meeting or when on official business of the Authority. The per diem payments made to each
member of the Authority shall include the necessary time spent in traveling to and from their place
of residence within the State to any place of meeting or while traveling on official business of the
Authority.
(6) The Duties of the Authority are as follows:
(a) To appoint hearing officers pursuant to subsection (7) below;
(b) To issue or deny permits for development pursuant to the provisions of Sec-
tions 7 and 8 of this Act;
(c) To conduct or cause to be conducted investigation of proposed developments
in order to obtain sufficient evidence to enable a balanced judgment to be rendered
concerning the issuance of a permit to build such developments;
(d) To designate the form and content of permits to develop to be submitted to
the Authority pursuant to the provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of this Act;
(e) With prior approval of the Governor and Council of State, to acquire by
purchase, gift, condemnation, or otherwise, lands or any interest in any lands;
(f) To keep a list of interested persons who wish to be notified of proposed devel-
opments in the coastal zone and to so notify these persons in accordance with the
provisions of this Act. A reasonable registration fee, to defray the cost of handling and
mailing notices, may be charged to any person who registers with the Authority pursuant
to this Section;
(g) Upon a vote of the majority of the Authority to designate itself as Hearing
Officer in any case.
(7) Hearing Officers:
(a) Qualifications: The Coastal Zone Authority shall have the power to designate
up to eight (8) full-time hearing officers. The hearing officers shall be attorneys with
knowledge of and experience with the rules of evidence. On petition of the Authority,
supported by reasonable evidence that six (6) hearing officers are insufficient to handle
the burden of conducting hearings pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the Governor
is empowered to appoint additional hearing officers as may be necessary.
(b) Duties: The hearing officers shall conduct hearings and submit recommenda-
tions to the Authority pursuant to the provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of this Act. In
addition the hearing officers shall obtain such evidence, reports, and technical informa-
tion from any person as may in their judgment be necessary to provide the Authority
with complete recommendations pursuant to Sections 7 and 8 of this Act.
(8)' In order to carry out the provisions of this Act, the Authority may employ such clerical,
technical, and professional personnel with such qualifications as the Authority may prescribe, in
accordance with the State Personnel Regulations and Budgetary Laws, and is hereby authorized
to pay such personnel from any funds made available to it through grants and appropriations made
to itself or to any other agency of the State for the benefit of the Authority. The Authority may,
with the approval of the Governor, employ such consultants as it deems necessary and may
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compensate same for services received.
(9) The Attorney General shall act as attorney for the Authority and shall initiate actions
in the name of, and at the request of, the Authority, and shall represent the Authority in hearing
of any appeal from or other review of any order of the Authority.
Section 6. State Coastal Land and Water Use Statement.
(I) The State Coastal Resources Planning Commission shall prepare a Statement (in words,
maps, illustrations, or other media of communiation) setting forth objectives, policies, and guide-
lines relating to public and private development of lands and waters within the coastal zone. In
preparing such Statement and any amendment thereto, the Commission shall to the extent feasible:
(a) Consult with and obtain the comments of any federal, state, regional, or local
agency having any special expertise with respect to any environmental impact;
(b) Consider all plans, studies, surveys, inventories, and systems of classification
made or being made by federal, state, regional, or local agencies, by private individuals,
or by organizations dealing with the coastal zone;
(c) Conduct or support such further research, studies, surveys, and interviews as
are deemed necessary;
(d) Utilize all available information regarding hydrology, geography, topography,
ecology, economics, and other pertinent data;
(e) Seek the active participation of officials of the local governments and regional
planning groups and councils of government for the particular areas involved.
(2) The Statement shall include the following:
(a) The designation of all lands of the coastal zone which have not been designated
as areas of critical state concern pursuant to section 7 as urban-developmental or rural.
Such designation shall be based upon studies of the ecological, physical, social, eco-
nomic, and governmental conditions and trends and shall aim at guiding development
in a coordinated manner so as to maximize the quality of life of the people and to
minimize adverse environmental and ecological effects. The designation shall be accom-
panied by rules stating those uses of land which will not be permitted in areas designated
rural. Such rule shall specify what uses shall not be permitted in areas designated rural.
The State shall not exercise under this Act any control over the use of lands designated
urban-developmental except as provided in section 8. Local governments shall have full
power to control land use pursuant to the laws of this state in areas designated urban-
developmental and in areas designated rural, provided that laws, ordinances, and prac-
tices of local governments shall not allow any use to be carried on in a rural area where
use is not permitted by the Statement;
(b) Provision for the protection of present common law and statutory public rights
in the lands and waters of the coastal zone including, where appropriate, provision for
public access to publicly owned areas;
(c) Provision for economic development of the coastal zone including, but not
limited to, the location and design of industries, port facilities, commerce, and other
developments;
(d) Provision for recreational and tourist facilities and parklands;
(e) Provision for the transportation and circulation pattern for the coastal zone
including major thoroughfares, transportation routes, and other public utilities and
facilities;
(0 Provision for the preservation and conservation of natural resources including,
but not limited to, water quality and use, scenic vistas, and fish and wildlife protection;
(g) Provision for the preservation and enhancement of the historic, cultural, and
scientific aspects of the coastal zone;
(h) Any other provision deemed necessary or appropriate to effectuate the policy
of this act.
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(3) Before adopting the Statement, the Commission shall hold public hearings in Manteo,
Morehead City, and Wilmington at which public and private parties shall have the opportunity to
present their comments and views. Copies of the Statement shall be made available for public
inspection at the county seat of each county affected at least thirty (30) days before the date on
which hearings are scheduled to begin.
(4) Following such public hearings, the Commission shall adopt the Statement together with
any changes it may deem appropriate.
(5) The Statement shall be submitted to the General Assembly on or before January 1, 1975.
(6) The Statement shall be effective
(a) on approval with or without modification by concurrent resolution of both
houses of the General Assemb!y; or
(b) on the expiration of ninety (90) legislative days on or at the end of the regular
session of the General Assembly, whichever is earlier.
(7) Subsection 2(a) of this Section shall be of binding effect on all state agencies and units
of local government. Local zoning and subdivision regulation shall be exercised only insofar as it
is consistent with this part of the Statement. The other parts of the Statement shall not be binding
but shall be used to guide the decision-making of all state agencies and units of local government
with jurisdiction over the coastal zone.
(8) After the Statement becomes effective, the Commission shall reconvene at five-year
intervals to examine the implementation and administration of the Statement and to consider
whether the Statement should be amended. The Commission shall, after public hearings in Manteo,
Morehead City, and Wilmington, propose any necessary amendments to the General Assembly.
Such amendments shall become effective pursuant to the procedure in subsection (6) of this section,
Section 7. Areas of Critical State Concern.
(1) Within one (1) year after the effective date of this Act, the State Coastal Resources
Planning Commission shall by rule designate particular geographic areas of the Coastal Zone as
areas of critical state concern and specify the boundaries thereof. In the rule designating an area
of critical state concern, the State Coastal Resources Planning Commission shall state the reasons
why the particular areas are of critical concern for the state.
(2) Prior to adopting any rule under this Section, the Commission shall consult with local
governments and multi-county regional planning authorities and shall hold a public hearing in each
county in which lands to be affected are located, giving notice thereof to interested state agencies,
any citizen or group which has filed a request to be notified pursuant to section 5(11), and each
owner or claimed owner of such lands by certified or registered mail at least twenty-one (21) days
prior thereto.
(3) Upon adoption of such rule or any rule amending, modifying, or repealing the same, the
Chairman shall cause a copy thereof, together with a plan of the lands affected and a list of the
owners or claimed owners of such lands, to be recorded in the register of deeds office in the county
where the land is located and shall mail a copy of such order and plan to each owner or claimed
owner of such lands affected thereby.
(4) An area of critical state concern shall be designated for:
(a) Beaches, dunelands, marshlands as defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-
230(n)(3) and estuarine waters as defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-230(n)(2);
(b) Areas containing or having a significant impact upon environmental, histori-
cal, or natural resources of regional or statewide importance;
(c) Areas containing unique or fragile ecosystems which are not capable of with-
standing uncontrolled development;
(d) Areas such as waterways to which the public has certain rights under state law;
(e) Areas such as flood plains and dunelands which, if subjected to uncontrolled
development, will increase the likelihood of flood damage and erosion which may neces-
sitate large expenditures of public funds;
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(f) An area significantly affected by, or having a significant effect upon, an exist-
ing or proposed major public facility or other area of major public investment.
(5) After the effective date of any rule designating areas of critical state concern, prior to
undertaking any development in any such area, the developer shall first obtain a permit from the
Coastal Zone Authority pursuant to the following procedure:
(a) The developer shall file with the Authority an application for a permit in
accordance with the form and content designated by the Authority, stating specifically
that the proposed development will take place in an area of critical state concern;
(b) Within thirty (30) days of receipt of the application, the Authority shall con-
duct a hearing in the courthouse of the county in which the development will be located.
(c) Notice: At least three weeks prior to the hearing, notice of the hearing shall
be sent by regular mail to any person registered with the Authority pursuant to Section
5(11).
In addition, at least two weeks prior to the hearing, notice of the hearing shall be
posted at three prominent places on the site of the proposed development and shall be
displayed in the courthouse in which the hearing is to take place.
Notice" of the hearing shall state that the proposed development is to take place in
an area designated as of critical state concern.
(d) Any interested person may present evidence at the hearing concerning whether
the permit should or should not be granted. The officer in charge of the hearing is
empowered to make reasonable rules limiting the time or manner of presentation of
evidence. Where appropriate, the officer is empowered to issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence, to administer oaths, and to take
testimony as may be necessary in conformity with the provisions of this Act. The officer
shall keep minutes or a record of the hearing in such manner as he determines to be
desirable and feasible. A copy of the record shall be furnished to any party to the hearing
upon request therefor and payment of the reasonable cost thereof.
(e) Within a week of the close of the hearing, the hearing officer shall certify and
file with the Authority recommendations, findings of fact, and a proposed order.
(f) Within sixty (60) days of receipt of the hearing officer's report, except as
provided below, the Authority shall render a decision as to the issuance of the permit.
In doing so the Authority shall consider whether and the extent to which the develop-
ment
(i) will significantly infringe on the legal rights of the public;
(ii) exceeds the capacity of the area to absorb development without changing its
essential character;
(iii) is likely to result in the necessity for significant expenditures of public funds;
(iv) will have a significant adverse effect on wildlife or natural ecosystems or on
an historical site of regional or state importance;
(v) is being built in an area where transportation facilities, water supply, orwaste
treatment facilities are inadequate;
(vi) if the development is likely to generate employment, whether it will be
located in an area with the capacity to provide adequate housing for potential employees.
In reaching its decision, the Authority shall not be limited to evidence presented at
the hearing but may consider such additional evidence as may be presented to it subse-
quent to the hearing which it deems necessary to reach a decision. In any case in which
the Authority does consider additional evidence, it must notify all parties to the hearing
that additional evidence is being considered, state the nature of the evidence, and give
any party two weeks in which to send a written reply, rebuttal, or comment. When
necessary, at the discretion of the Authority, the time in which the Authority shall render
a decision may be extended an additional two weeks beyond the sixty days provided in
this Part.
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(g) By majority vote, the Authority shall deny a permit if, in its judgment, using
the above criteria, the proposed development is inadvisable or undesirable. The Author-
ity may condition the grant of a permit upon the applicant's amending his proposal to
take whatever measures are reasonably necessary to protect the public interest with
respect to the factors enumerated in subsection (f) above. Every decision of the Authority
shall be in writing accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings
of fact shall consist of a concise and separate statement of the ultimate conclusions upon
each material issue of fact without recital of evidence.
(6) Judicial Review: Decisions of the Authority are reviewable pursuant to the provisions of
Section 9 of this Act. Any person presenting evidence pursuant to subsection 5(d) above shall be
deemed a party to the hearing with standing to appeal. Pending final disposition of any appeal, no
action shall be taken which would be unlawful in the absence of a permit issued under this Section.
Section 8. Permits for Developments of Regional Impact. Because large scale developments
are likely to be of sufficient magnitude to create problems in or significantly effect areas of
statewide or regional importance, the Legislature hereby establishes a permit-granting procedure
which shall be followed in all cases where developments of regional impact arc proposed.
(I) Definition of development of regional impact. A development is of regional impact if any
of the following characteristics are true: It
(a) Proposes to make use of an area of - acres or more; or
(b) Will provide, upon completion the employment of - individuals; or
(c) Will provide - number of housing units; or
(d) May be reasonably expected to affect the ambient air quality of an area
covering - square miles; or
(e) Will need to utilize over - gallons of water per day; or
(f) Will require minimum parking space for - numbers of vehicles.
(2) Procedure for obtaining a permit to build a development of regional impact. Prior to
undertaking any development of regional impact, the developer shall file an application for a
permit with the Authority. The permit shall be in accordance with the form and content designated
by the Authority pursuant to Section 5. Upon receipt of application, if the applicant so requests,
the Authority shall conduct an investigation to determine whether the proposed development falls
within the meaning of "development of regional impact" as defined by subsection (1) of this
Section. Within sixty (60) days of receipt of the application, the Authority must issue, in writing,
a binding opinion as to whether the development is of regional impact. There is no appeal from
this decision of the Authority.
(a) If the Authority deems the development to be of regional impact, the following
procedures shall be adhered to:
(i) within thirty (30) days of its decision that the proposed development is of
regional impact, the Authority shall conduct a hearing in the courthouse of the county
in which the development will be located.
(ii) notice: At least three weeks prior to the hearing, notice of the hearing shall
be sent by certified mail to any local government which may reasonably be expected to
be significantly affected by the proposed development.
Notice shall also be sent by regular mail to any person registered with the
Authority pursuant to Section 5(11) at least two weeks prior to the hearing.
In addition, at least two weeks prior to the hearing, notice of the hearing shall
be posted at three prominent places on the site of the proposed development, and shall
be displayed in the courthouse in which the hearing is to take place.
Notice of the hearing shall state that the proposed development has been certified
by the Coastal Zone Authority as having regional impact.
(iii) any interested person may present evidence at the hearing concerning
whether the permit should or should not be granted. The hearing officer in charge of
the hearing is empowered to make reasonable rules limiting the time or manner of
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presentation of evidence. Where appropriate, the hearing officer is empowered to issue
subpoenas requiring the attendence of witnesses and the production of evidence, to
administer oaths, and to take testimony as may be necessary in conformity with the
provisions of this Act. The officer shall keep minutes or a record of the hearing in such
manner as he determines to be desirable and feasible. A copy of the record shall be
furnished to any party to the hearing upon request therefor and payment of the reasona-
ble cost thereof.
(iv) within a week of the close of the hearing, the hearing officer shall certify and
file with the Authority recommendations, findings of fact, and a proposed order.
(v) within sixty (60) days of receipt of the hearing officer's report, the Authority
shall render a decision as to the issuance of the permit. In reaching its decision, the
Authority shall consider whether and the extent to which:
-the beneficial effects of the development to the locale for which it is proposed
are outweighed by adverse effects to other areas;
-the transportation facilities, water supply, and waste treatment facilities are
adequate.
-if the development is likely to generate employment, the capacity of the area
in question to provide adequate housing for potential employees;
-the probability that at the time the development work begins the developer will
have adequate financing to complete the development according to plans and specifica-
tions.
In addition, after the adoption by the General Assembly of the Statement as
provided in Section 6 above, whether the proposed development is in conformity with
the land use specifications of said Statement.
In reaching its decision, the Authority shall not be limited to evidence presented
at the hearing but may consider such additional evidence as may be presented to it
subsequent to the hearing which it deems necessary to reach a decision. In any case in
which the Authority does consider additional evidence, it must notify all parties to the
hearing that additional evidence is being considered, state the nature of the evidence,
and give any party two weeks in which to send a written reply, rebuttal, or comment.
When necessary, at the discretion of the Authority the time in which the authority shall
render a decision may be extended an additional two weeks beyond the sixty days
provided in this Part.
(b) By majority vote, the Authority shall deny a permit if, in its judgment, the
above criteria are not met. The Authority may condition the grant of a permit upon the
applicant's amending his proposal to take whatever measures are reasonably necessary
to protect the public interest with respect to the factors enumerated in 2(a)(v) of this
Section. Every decision of the Authority shall be in writing accompanied by findings of
fact and conclusions of law. The findings of fact shall consist of a concise and separate
statement of the ultimate conclusions upon each material issue of fact without recital
of evidence.
(3) Judicial Review: Decisions of the Authority are appealable pursuant to the provisions
of Section 9 of this Act. Any person presenting evidence pursuant to 2(a)(iii) of this Section shall
be deemed a party to the hearing with standing to appeal. Pending final disposition of any appeal,
no action shall be taken which would be unlawful in the absence of a permit issued under this
Section.
Section 9. Judicial Review. Any person given standing to appeal by Sections 7 and 8 of this
Act may obtain judicial review of the Authority's decision pursuant to the provisions of article 33
of the General Statutes, chapter 143. The Authority shall be named as a defendant to the action.
In addition, any person presenting evidence in support of the Authority's decision at the hearing
which is the subject of appeal may be joined as a defendant to the action. Nothing in this chapter
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shall prevent any person from invoking any judicial remedy available to him under the law to test
the validity of any administrative action not made available under this Section.
Section 10. Enforcement and Penalties.
(I) Any person who violates any provision of this Act, or any regulation adopted by the
Authority, or who violates any determination or order of the Authority pursuant to this Act, shall
be liable to a penalty not to exceed $____ for said violation and an additional penalty of not to
exceed $_ for each day during which violation continues, which may be recovered in a civil
action, and such person may be enjoined from continuing such violation as herein provided. Any
person who violates this Act, or an order or other determination of the Authority under this Act,
and causes the death of fish, wildlife, or aquatic life shall, in addition to other penalties provided
by this Act, be liable to pay the State an additional sum for the reasonable value of the fish, wildlife,
or aquatic life destroyed. Any money so recovered shall be divided between the Wildlife Resources
Commission and the Bureau of Commercial and Sport Fisheries for use in restoring the wildlife,
aquatic life, and or fish balance.
(2) The Solicitor of the county in which the violation occurred, or the Attorney General, shall
bring actions brought under this Act in the name of the people of North Carolina.
(3) At the discretion of the court, up to one-half of the fine levied (with the exception of
that recovered for wildlife and for fish destruction) may be paid to any person or persons giving
substantial information from which conviction results.
(4) It shall be a misdemeanor to violate this Act or regulations thereunder, or knowingly to
submit any false information under this Act or regulations adopted thereunder. It shall be the duty
of all state and local law enforcement officers to enforce such Act and regulations, and all such
officers shall have authority to issue citations for such violations.
(5) The citizens of this state are encouraged to keep a vigilant watch on the activities taking
place in the coastal region. Any citizen or group of citizens who reasonably believe a violation of
the provisions of the Act is taking place or has taken place may file a complaint in writing with
state or local law enforcement officers, whichever is appropriate, stating with specificity what act
or acts the complainant believes is taking place in violation of the Act. If the name or names of
the alleged violators are known or may be reasonably discovered, a copy of said complaint must
be sent to alleged violators by the local or state law enforcement offices. The officers must conduct
a preliminary investigation within twenty-one (21) days to dtermine if probable cause exists to
issue a citation to alleged violators. Specious, frivolous, or malicious complaints shall be treated
as a misdemeanor, and any person who knowingly files such complaint may be subject to a fine
not exceeding $500, imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. Valid complaints initiated
by private citizens may be rewarded as provided in subsection (3) of this Section.
Section 11. Coordination with the Federal Government. All state agencies shall keep in-
formed of federal and interstate agency plans, activities, and procedures within their area of
expertise that affect the coastal zone. Where federal or interstate agency plans, activities, or
procedures conflict with state policies, all reasonable steps shall be taken by the state to preserve
the integrity of its policies.
Section 12. Coordination with State and Local Governments. All state agencies, counties,
and public and municipal corporations shall review administrative and management policies, regu-
lations, plans, and ordinances relative to lands under their respective jurisdictions adjacent to the
shorelines and coastal regions of the state so as to achieve a use policy on said lands consistent
with the policy of this Act, the guidelines, rules, and Statement. Local governments shall, in
developing use regulations of such areas, take into consideration any recommendations, rules, and
guidelines developed by the Coastal Resources Planning Commission, as well as those of any other
state agencies or units of local government. The Coastal Zone Authority shall work in cooperation
with said agencies, counties, and municipal and public corporations. In instances where the spheres
of interest overlap and policies differ, the Authority and the agency, county, or municipal or public
corporation whose policy conflicts with the Authority's are empowered to make agreements con-
cerning the harmonious settlement of such conflict in the best interests of the conservation and
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best utilization of the coastal resources of the state. In the event that the Authority and any agency,
county, or municipal or public corporation cannot agree, the Governor is empowered to resolve
the differences.
Section 13. Protection of Landowners' Rights. Nothing in this Act authorizes any govern-
mental agency to adopt a rule or regulation or to issue any order that constitutes a taking of
property without the payment of full compensation in violation of the constitution of this state or
of the United States.
Section 14. Appropriation. A sum of $S is appropriated from the general revenue fund
to the Department of Administration for the purposes of paying salaries and other administrative
expenses.
Section 15. Severability. If any provision of this Act, or its application to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act, or the application of the provisions to other
persons or circumstances, is not affected.
Section 16. Effective Date. This Act shall become effective on ratification.

